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ABSTRACT 
This iBrief examines the U.S. strategy for strengthening the 
protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in Southeast Asia 
through the use of free trade agreements (FTAs).  After briefly 
examining the U.S. methodology for strengthening IPRs outside the 
U.S., this iBrief predicts that the intellectual property provisions in 
the final text of the U.S.-Thailand FTA, which is currently being 
negotiated, will be very similar to the provisions in previous FTAs 
that the United States has negotiated with other developing 
countries. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The violation of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is a huge global 
problem.  The World Customs Organization estimates that counterfeiting 
accounts for six percent of global merchandise trade.2  The World Health 
Organization reports that approximately ten percent of medicines worldwide 
are counterfeited, costing the pharmaceutical industry over forty-five billion 
dollars a year. 3  What is more, thirty-nine percent of the software used by 
companies worldwide qualifies as being pirated.4   
¶2 Like many developing nations, Thailand is a source of pirated 
goods.5  According to the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, in 
recent years nearly sixty percent of counterfeit apparel seized by customs 
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13, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1709267.stm.  
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authorities in the European Community originated in Thailand.6  
Furthermore, Thailand has been designated by the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) as a country that needs to improve its intellectual 
property (IP) protection regime.7 
¶3 For over twenty years, the U.S. has been increasing its emphasis on 
the protection of IPRs outside its borders, and Thailand is the next stop on 
this campaign.  This iBrief examines the U.S. strategy for strengthening 
IPRs in developing nations and predicts some of the provisions to be 
included in the intellectual property chapter of the U.S.-Thailand Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA). 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
PROTECTION OUTSIDE THE U.S. 
¶4 Since the 1960s, IP protection around the globe has been critical to 
the developed world, the U.S. included.  Developed countries were losing 
their traditional advantage in the production of manufactured goods, and the 
only remaining comparative advantage rested in high-tech goods. Because 
high-tech goods are generally expensive to create but cheap to copy, and 
because international trade meant that these high-tech goods were sold 
around the world, countries like the U.S. needed IPRs to be enforced 
globally.8 
¶5 The U.S. first sought to protect IPRs through an international 
agreement on the trade of counterfeit goods, introduced at the Tokyo Round 
of negotiations of what later became the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
However, the agreement was thwarted by a united front of developing 
countries, and the U.S. was forced to change strategies to accomplish its 
goals.9 First, the U.S. turned to unilateral pressure to increase IPRs in the 
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developing world through legislation called “Special 301.”10  The U.S. later 
turned its attention to bilateral negotiations resulting in dozens of bilateral 
investment treaties and FTAs.11 
A.  Special 301 
¶6 In order to achieve the desired levels of IP protection in developing 
nations, the U.S. amended the Trade Act of 1974 to link trade and IP via an 
instrument known as “Special 301.”12  The “Special 301” provisions of the 
amended Trade Act require the USTR “to identify foreign countries that 
deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights or fair 
and equitable market access” for U.S. citizens or entities that rely on IP 
protection.13  Depending on the extent of deficiency of IP protection, these 
foreign countries are placed onto either the “Priority Foreign Countries” list, 
the “Priority Watch List,” the “Watch List,” or the “Section 306 
Monitoring” list.14   
¶7 In its 2005 Special 301 Report, the USTR placed fifty-two countries 
on one of these lists.15  “A 301 investigation may culminate in a bilateral 
agreement between the [U.S.] and the target state, or failing that, the 
imposition of trade sanctions by the [U.S.] . . . .”16  As a result, bilateral 
agreements between the U.S. and its trading partners have been increasing 
since the 1980s.17 
¶8 Eventually, the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations produced an 
agreement known as the Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which requires all WTO members to 
adhere to minimum standards of IP protection.18  Despite having the TRIPS 
agreement, the U.S. continues to use bilateral agreements to extend the level 
                                                     
10 See discussion infra para. 6–7.   
11 Further information on these agreements can be found at the USTR Website, 
http://www.ustr.gov/. 
12  Office of the United States Trade Representative, Background on Special 
301, 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/2005
_Special_301/asset_upload_file223_7646.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2006). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 7, at 1. 
16 Drahos, supra note 9, at 792. 
17 Id. at 792-93. 
18 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-
trips_01_e.htm.  
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of IP protection in developing nations beyond the minimal standards laid 
out in TRIPS.19 
B. Bilateral Policy: BITs and FTAs 
¶9 As one of the world’s most ardent advocates of stronger protections 
for IP, “the U.S. has consistently followed a policy of elevating IPRs 
standards abroad through the use of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral 
action.”20 Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and FTAs are part of “a 
ratcheting process that is seeing IP norms globalize at a remarkable rate.”21 
¶10 The U.S. is a party to nearly forty BITs.22  A BIT is an agreement 
between two sovereign nations to establish a stable investment climate 
within their borders for the investors of the parties to the agreement.  While 
the purpose of a BIT is to protect investment, IP also receives protection as 
a byproduct.  For example, the Mozambique Bilateral Investment Treaty,23 
which entered into force in 2005, protects intellectual property as a type of 
investment.24   
¶11 BITs are not the best method for improving IP protection in 
developing nations for a number of reasons, all relating to their brevity in 
comparison to FTAs.  An FTA is an agreement between two or more 
sovereign nations to remove all substantial barriers to trade (e.g. tariffs, 
regulatory requirements) between the nations.  First, BITs, while including 
IP as a type of investment, do not devote an entire article or chapter to IP as 
FTAs do.  Therefore, the protection afforded IP by the treaty is less detailed 
and also less predictable.  Second, the main purpose of BITs is the 
assurance that foreign investors will be given the same treatment afforded to 
                                                     
19 In the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, Congress stated that 
“[t]he principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade-
related intellectual property are . . . to further . . . protection of intellectual 
property rights . . . ensuring that the provisions of any multilateral or bilateral 
trade agreement governing intellectual property rights . . . reflect a standard of 
protection similar to that found in United States law.” 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(4)(A) 
(2000).  
20 Pedro Roffe, Bilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-plus World: The Chile-USA 
Free Trade Agreement TRIPS Issues Papers (Quaker International Affairs 
Programme, Ottawa) 2004, at 3, available at 
http://geneva.quno.info/pdf/Chile(US)final.pdf.  
21 Drahos, supra note 9, at 798. 
22 The Trade Compliance Center lists these agreements, 
http://www.tcc.mac.doc.gov/.  
23 Mozambique Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Mozam., Dec. 1, 1998, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 106-31 (1998). 
24 Id., art. I. 
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domestic investors.25  On the other hand, the IP chapters in FTAs seek to 
completely change the IP regime in the developing signatory State, thus 
giving foreign IP owners in developing nations more protection than existed 
in developing countries before the FTA was signed.   
¶12 Consequently, the U.S. has become increasingly involved in FTA 
negotiations.  The remainder of this iBrief will focus on the FTA 
negotiations between Thailand and the U.S.  More specifically, this iBrief 
will use the precedent set by previous U.S. FTAs to demonstrate that the IP 
provisions that will be included in the U.S.-Thai agreement will likely be 
very similar to those previously negotiated agreements. 
¶13 FTA negotiations between the U.S. and Thailand began in July 
2004 and are expected to conclude sometime this year.26  Thus far, six 
rounds of negotiations have occurred,27 and IPRs, especially relating to the 
pharmaceutical industry, have already been dubbed “a sensitive issue” by 
negotiators on both sides. 28 
II. A SNAPSHOT OF THAI IP LAW 
¶14 Thailand has numerous laws in place to protect IP.29  However, 
enforcement of those laws remains an issue.  Enforcement of IPRs in 
Thailand is slowly meeting foreign investors’ objectives in policing the 
marketplace to suppress fakes and pirated goods.30  “A key factor to 
improvement of enforcement efforts is having IP owners work in close 
cooperation with Thai law enforcement and government agencies.” 31 Such 
                                                     
25 See the first page of the latest model U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(completed in 2004), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.pdf. 
26 Thailand, US Agree to Wrap Up FTA Talks in 2006, THAI PRESS REP., Sept. 
23, 2005. 
27 As of January 13, 2006.  See USTR—Statement of Barbara Weisel (Jan. 13, 
2006),  
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2006/January/Statement
_of_Barbara_Weisel_Assistant_US_Trade_Representative_Regarding_the_6th_
Round_of_the_US-Thail_FTA_Negotiations.html.  
28 See, e.g., Thailand, US Agree to Wrap Up FTA Talks in 2006, supra note 26. 
29 Legal protection of intellectual property is based on the provisions of the 
Trademark Act B.E. 2534 (A.D. 1991), the Trademark Act (No. 2) B.E. 2543 
(A.D. 2000), the Patent Act B.E. 2522 (A.D. 1979), the Patent Act (No. 2) B.E. 
2535 (A.D. 1992), the Patent Act (No. 3) B.E. 2542 22 (A.D. 1999), the 
Copyright Act B.E. 2521 (A.D. 1978), the Copyright Act B.E. 2537 (A.D. 
1994), as well as other laws such as the Civil and Commercial Code, Penal 
Code, and Consumer Protection Act. 
30 Arnold and Kelly, supra note 6, at 2. 
31 Id. 
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cooperation is slowly happening throughout the country, but Thailand still 
has a significant way to go before IP infringement will be under control. 
¶15 While enforcement is of utmost priority in improving the IP regime 
in Thailand, the new IP provisions of the Thai FTA provisions are also 
extremely important.  These new provisions will have a significant impact 
on the IP marketplace as Thai IP law is brought more in line with U.S. law.   
III. PREDICTIONS FOR THE U.S.-THAI AGREEMENT 
¶16 Due to the strength of the U.S. as compared to the majority of its 
trading partners, the bilateral agreements to which it is a party are typically 
very similar.  Drahos notes that: 
In bilateral trade negotiations between states involving a strong and 
weak state, generally speaking the strong state comes along with a 
prepared draft text which acts as a starting point for the negotiations... 
In order to lower the transaction costs of bilateralism the [U.S.] has 
developed models or prototypes of the kind of bilateral treaties it 
wishes to have with other countries...  So, for example, … the Free 
Trade Agreement that the [U.S.] has negotiated with Jordan will serve 
as a model for other FTAs being negotiated with Chile and 
Singapore.”32
¶17 A central aspect of the most recent series of FTAs entered into by 
the U.S. is the establishment of IP protections that exceed the TRIPS 
minimum standards.  This section of the iBrief predicts the IP provisions of 
the Thai-US FTA based on an examination of the IP chapters in the 
following U.S. FTAs:33 
1. The Singaporean FTA, signed in January 2003, is the 
first FTA between the U.S. and a Southeast Asian 
State;34   
2. The Chilean FTA, signed in June 2003, is the first 
FTA between the U.S. and a South American 
country;35 and 
                                                     
32 Drahos, supra note 9, at 794. 
33 These particular agreements were chosen because their intellectual property 
provisions are representative of the intellectual property chapters in all the most 
recent U.S. FTAs. For a more in-depth discussion involving all of the most 
recent FTAs, see Home Page of Consumer Project on Technology, 
http://www.cptech.org/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).  
34 United States—Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003 
[hereinafter Singapore FTA], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/S
ection_Index.html. 
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3. The Australian FTA, signed in May 2004, is the first 
FTA signed in the 21st century between the U.S. and a 
developed country.36 
A. Patent Law: Pharmaceuticals 
1. Patent Term Extension 
¶18 Much of the controversy surrounding IP protection involves issues 
affecting the pharmaceutical industry.37  One such protection, which is 
strongly advocated by the pharmaceutical industry, is patent term extension.  
Extension for a patent term is sought when an abnormal delay in the 
regulatory approval process reduces the effective life of a patent.  The 
Singaporean, Chilean, and Australian FTAs all contain provisions granting 
patent term extensions when a delay in the granting of a patent exceeds a 
certain amount of time (four to five years).38  In addition, each of the 
agreements grants extensions to compensate for “unreasonable delay” in the 
granting of regulatory marketing approval.39 
¶19 Because patent term extension provisions have been included in the 
most recent U.S. FTAs,  it is highly likely that similar provisions will also 
be included in the final text of the Thai agreement.  As the Thai drug 
regulatory office frequently delays approval of drugs,40 it is expected that 
                                                                                                                       
35 Chile—United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003 
[hereinafter Chile FTA], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/Sectio
n_Index.html. 
36 Australia—United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004 
[hereinafter Australia FTA], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_Text/Se
ction_Index.html. 
37 See, e.g., Rahul Rajkumar, The Central American Free Trade Agreement: An 
End Run Around the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, 15 ALB. 
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 433, 433 (2005); Hamed El-Said and Mohammed El-Said, 
TRIPS, Bilateralism, Multilateralism & Implications for Developing Countries: 
Jordan’s Drug Sector, 2 Manchester J. Int’l Econ. L. 59, 59 (2005); Adam 
Graham-Silverman, Big Pharma’s Free Ride, Salon.com, Aug. 12, 2005, 
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2005/08/12/cafta_drugs/index_np.html. 
38 Singapore FTA, supra note 34, art. 16.7.7; Chile FTA, supra note 35, art. 
17.9.6; Australia FTA, supra note 36, art. 17.9.8.a. 
39 Singapore FTA, supra note 34, art. 18.8.4; Chile FTA, supra note 35, art. 
17.10.2.a; Australia FTA, supra note 36, art. 17.9.8.b. 
40 “The major obstacles to foreign companies lie in skirting the regulatory 
system's widespread corruption, which can manifest itself in everything from 
intentional delays in the approval process to weak IPR protection.” Ames Gross, 
New Regulatory Trends In Thailand's Pharmaceutical Market, Pacific Bridge 
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patent term extension provisions will be heavily relied on by the foreign 
pharmaceutical industry in Thailand to lengthen the effective life41 of its 
drug patents. 
2. Compulsory Licensing 
¶20 A second issue is the compulsory licensing of patents, which is 
currently allowed (though never exercised) by the government under Thai 
law.42  This issue has been addressed by the U.S. FTAs in two different 
manners.43  The first approach, used in the Chilean agreement, applies the 
TRIPS standards.44  TRIPS states that governments may issue compulsory 
licenses for any reason so long as a certain number of conditions are met 
(e.g. prior negotiations for a voluntary license, and royalty payments).45  
Additionally, TRIPS allows for the waiver of the conditions in certain 
situations.46  A second approach, used in the Singaporean and Australian 
agreements, limits the use of compulsory licenses to antitrust remedies, 
public non-commercial use, or national emergencies.47 
¶21 In the Thai agreement, the provision for compulsory licenses could 
follow either of the manners described above—TRIPS standard or 
limitation to certain situations.  Because the majority of pharmaceutical 
innovators in Thailand are foreign-owned, the TRIPS standard will be 
sought by the Thai negotiators, because it arguably allows greater 
opportunity for generic companies to make patented drugs via compulsory 
licenses granted by the Thai government.48  However, even if the more 
stringent standard for issuing compulsory licenses found in the Singapore 
and Australian FTAs was used, the Thai government would still be able to 
                                                                                                                       
Medical—Thailand Medical Publications (1999), 
http://www.pacificbridgemedical.com/publications/html/ThailandMar1999.htm. 
41 The effective life of a patent is the patent term remaining once full regulatory 
approval has been granted.  While the patent term in the U.S. is twenty years, 
the average effective patent life of a drug is ten to twelve years.  
42 Thailand Legal Basics: Intellectual Property Rights Laws, a publication by 
Tilleke & Gibbins Int’l Ltd., at 18, 
http://www.tillekeandgibbins.com/Publications/thailand_legal_basics/index.html. 
43 A compulsory license gives permission to another producer to make the 
patented product without the patent holder's consent.  
44 Chile FTA, supra note 35, art. 17.1.5. 
45 TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 31. 
46 Id. 
47 Singapore FTA, supra note 34, art. 16.7.6; Australia FTA, supra note 36, art. 
17.9.7. 
48 See Carsten Fink and Patrick Reichenmiller, Tightening Trips: The 
Intellectual Property Provisions of Recent US Free Trade Agreements, (Int’l 
Trade Dep’t of the World Bank Group) Feb. 7, 2005, at 2, 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/trade/worldbank02072005.pdf. 
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issue compulsory licenses under the conditions of a national emergency or 
for public, non-commercial use.49 
3. Linkage Between Patent Status and Generic Drug Approval 
¶22 A third issue involves the linkage between a patent’s status and 
generic drug marketing approval.  In other words, the issue is whether a 
generic drug can be given marketing approval during the life of the patent 
from which the generic drug is derived.  For this particular issue, the 
Singaporean agreement has been the gold-standard, its wording adopted 
almost verbatim by all subsequent U.S. FTAs.50  The Singaporean 
agreement states that the regulatory authority may not grant marketing 
approval to a generic drug while the brand name drug is under patent 
(unless authorized by the patent owner), and, in addition, the patent owner 
must be notified of the name of the generic company requesting marketing 
approval.51 
¶23 It is highly probable that the Thai agreement will also proscribe 
Thailand from granting marketing approval for generic drugs while the 
brand name drug is under patent (unless authorized by the patent holder).  
This provision effectively renders compulsory licenses ineffectual since it is 
unlikely that a pharmaceutical patent owner will grant permission for a 
generic company to market its patented drug, effectively undercutting the 
patent holder in the marketplace.52 Additionally, even once the drug goes 
off patent, this provision will still delay the availability of generic drugs 
since they may no longer be approved and prepared for market distribution 
while the brand name drug is under patent. 
4. Data Exclusivity 
¶24 A fourth issue is data exclusivity.  To obtain marketing approval, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers must submit a significant amount of clinical 
data to regulatory bodies—data that typically costs hundreds of millions of 
dollars to produce.53  Generic drug manufacturers can later use that data to 
develop and approve their own generic versions of the drugs, thus bypassing 
a significant cost of pharmaceutical manufacturing.  Data exclusivity 
                                                     
49 The generic manufacturers, however, would need to become state-owned, or 
in some other manner, non-commercial. 
50 See, e.g., Chile FTA, supra note 35, art. 17.10.2.b-c.; Australia FTA, supra 
note 36, art. 17.10.4.b-c. 
51 Singapore FTA, supra note 34, art. 16.8.4.b-c. 
52 Fink and Reichenmiller, supra note 48, at 2. 
53 See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America Website, What 
Goes Into the Cost of Prescription Drugs, June 2005, 
http://www.phrma.org/files/Cost_of_Perscription_Drugs.pdf. 
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provisions essentially grant patent-like protection of the clinical data to their 
creator for a certain amount of time and for many of the same reasons that 
an actual patent is given to the pharmaceutical innovators.  Again, the 
Singapore FTA has set the standard for all subsequent agreements, 
providing five years of data exclusivity for the creators of clinical data.54  
Additionally, under the Australian agreement’s provisions, once marketing 
approval has been granted in another territory based on clinical data, that 
clinical data gains exclusivity in the territories of the Parties to the 
agreement.55 
¶25 Like its predecessor, the Thai FTA will likely have a provision 
which grants data exclusivity for five years.  Due to the huge expense in 
gathering clinical data, this provision will hamper the efforts of generic drug 
companies seeking to approve drugs based on data previously submitted by 
pharmaceutical innovators, and will also present another obstacle for the 
Thai government when seeking to make use of compulsory licenses.56 
¶26 It is likely that the U.S. negotiators will also push for a provision 
like that in the Australian agreement (described above), which grants data 
exclusivity in all FTA jurisdictions once the data has been approved by a 
regulatory authority in another country—even if that country is not a 
signatory of the FTA.  Thus in Thailand, generic manufacturers will not be 
allowed for a certain amount of time to rely on the clinical data submitted to 
a foreign regulator when seeking regulatory or marketing approval for its 
generic drug in Thailand.57 
5. Implications 
¶27 Because many of the issues above are not addressed in detail, if at 
all, under current Thai law, the above predicted provisions will have a 
number of effects in Thailand with regards to pharmaceutical drugs.  First, 
the above provisions will likely hamper the availability of generic drugs.  
The agreement will likely reduce the amount of generic drugs that come to 
market and will also likely lengthen the amount of time it takes for generics 
to get to market.  Additionally, the added protections given to 
pharmaceutical patents and clinical data will increase costs to local generic 
manufacturers due to the added burden of obtaining regulatory and 
marketing approval.  This in turn will raise costs of generic medicines.  
These higher costs will likely lead to the prescribing of older, off-patent 
                                                     
54 Singapore FTA, supra note 34, art. 16.8.1-3; See, e.g., Chile FTA, supra note 
35, art. 17.10.1. 
55 Australia FTA, supra note 36, art. 17.10. 
56 Fink and Reichenmiller, supra note 48 at 2. 
57 “In other words, test data exclusivity applies automatically in all FTA 
jurisdictions, once a company submits test data to a drug regulator in 
one territory—even outside the FTA area.” See id. at 3. 
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drugs, by government physicians because the older, off-patent drugs are less 
expensive, and thus are more likely to be approved for use under the 
national health plan. 
B. Patent Law: Plants 
¶28 A fifth issue, also related to patent law, is the patenting of life forms 
and, specifically, plants.  Those that support life form patenting maintain 
that granting patents motivates researchers to develop more healthy and 
productive forms of plants and animals.  Patented life forms include 
pesticide-resistant crops, larger, meatier livestock, etc.  Those that oppose 
the patenting of life forms fear that “big business” will oust local farmers 
and lay claim to the natural resources of developing countries.  Both the 
Singaporean and the Chilean agreements include no general exclusions of 
plants and animals from patentability.58  The Australian agreement allows 
exclusions of life form patents only for “moral, health, or safety reasons.”59 
¶29 All recent U.S. FTAs have included provisions allowing for 
patenting of life forms, especially plants, and it is more than likely that a 
similar provision will be included in the Thai agreement.  This is one of the 
most highly debated areas within the Thai agreement negotiations due to the 
fact that plants are not protected under the current regime60 and due to the 
argument that such a provision would have a detrimental impact on 
Thailand’s jasmine rice industry.  The National Human Rights Commission 
of Thailand contends that such a provision “would allow the American plant 
genetic researchers and companies to patent over any new variety of rice 
developed from Thai jasmine rise.”61  The Commission believes that this 
provision will greatly damage the agricultural industry in Thailand.62  
However, others maintain that such a provision will not greatly alter the 
jasmine rice industry in Thailand nor be overtaken by foreign competitors.63  
Proponents of life form patents maintain that patenting new types of rice 
will not prevent local farmers from growing the original strain of rice. 
                                                     
58 Singapore FTA, supra note 34, art. 16.7.1; Chile FTA, supra note 35, art. 
17.9.2. 
59 Australia FTA, supra note 36, art. 17.9.2.a. 
60 See supra note 29. 
61 National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, Official Statement of 
Concern over Ongoing Negotiations on the Thai-US Free Trade Agreement 
(Aug. 14, 2005), unofficial translation available at 
http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=2485.
62 Id.
63 Pichit Likitkijsomboon, Of Rice and Men, TECH CENT. STATION, July 8, 2005, 
http://www.techcentralstation.com/070805PL.html.  
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C. Copyright Law 
¶30 Patent law is not the only sector of IP to be affected by FTAs.  The 
copyright provisions of the U.S.-Thai agreement will likely also reflect the 
trend of increasing IPR protection. Many of the provisions relating to 
copyright have been standard since the Singapore FTA, and it is unlikely 
that the U.S. negotiators will vary from those provisions.  For example, 
beginning with the Singaporean agreement and onward, FTA provisions on 
the term of copyright protection have been virtually identical—life of the 
author plus seventy years, or if the term is decided on the basis on 
something other than the author’s life, seventy years from the publication or 
creation of the work.64  Consequently, the Thai agreement will likely mimic 
the provisions in the Singapore FTA, bringing Thai copyright terms into 
conformity with the majority of the developed world.  Currently, Thailand’s 
term for copyright protection is fifty years.65  Thus, this new provision will 
substantially alter the copyright regime in Thailand and will also have a 
substantial impact on the issue of works falling into the public domain. 
¶31 Another example of copyright protection standardization in U.S. 
FTAs is illustrated by the technological protection measures given to 
copyrighted works.66  Again, beginning with the Singaporean agreement 
and moving forward, the provisions on this matter are virtually identical, 
stating that countries must provide “adequate legal protection and effective 
remedies” against acts or devices that circumvent technological protection 
measures, with exemptions given to certain institutions (e.g., libraries and 
educational institutions).67  As in previous FTAs, the Thai FTA will likely 
state that Thailand must provide adequate protections and remedies against 
actions or devices that circumvent technological protection measures.   
¶32 Thai law has not kept up with evolving technology and the FTA 
provisions will add much in this area.  For example, currently computer 
programs are not given defined protection under copyright law in Thailand.  
Needless to say, the issue of technological protection measures also has not 
been addressed.  Thus, the FTA provisions, while modernizing Thailand’s 
copyright protection regime, will at the same time be taking away many of 
the “rights” Thai IP users are accustomed to having under the current 
regime. 
                                                     
64 See, e.g., Singapore FTA, supra note 34, art. 16.4.4; Chile FTA, supra note 
35, art. 17.5.4; Australia FTA, supra note 36, art. 17.4.4. 
65 See Thailand Copyright Act B.E. 2521 (A.D. 1978) and Thailand Copyright 
Act B.E. 2537 (A.D. 1994). 
66 Technological protection measures are devices and software developed to 
prevent unauthorized copying of digital works. Fink and Reichenmiller, supra 
note 48, at 4. 
67 Singapore FTA, supra note 34, art. 16.4.7. See, e.g., Chile FTA, supra note 
35, art. 17.7.5; Australia FTA, supra note 36, art. 17.4.7. 
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¶33 Thailand has much to gain from a FTA with the U.S.  The U.S. is 
Thailand’s largest export market with sales of a variety of goods and 
commodities climbing sixteen percent last year to almost eighteen-billion 
dollars.68  Additionally, according to a study conducted by the Thailand 
Development Research Institute in Bangkok, the U.S.-Thailand FTA is 
projected to boost trade between the two countries by a full five percent.69 
¶34 It is likely that the U.S.-Thailand FTA will contain IP provisions 
similar to those found in previous U.S. FTAs, which will require a number 
of broad changes to occur in Thailand.  First, many of Thailand’s IP laws 
will need to be re-written, or entirely new laws will need to be passed, in 
order to comply with the FTA.  Additionally, as enforcement of IPRs in 
Thailand remains a consistent problem, the U.S. will undoubtedly place a 
heavier emphasis on this issue in the months and years following the 
signing of the agreement.   
¶35 While the FTA provisions will perhaps harm certain sectors of the 
Thai economy like generic drug manufacturing in the short term, the FTA 
will prove to be a driving force in the development and growth of the Thai 
economy as a whole.  Trade will increase with the U.S. as a result of the 
FTA, and foreign investors will be less apprehensive about making IP 
investments into the country if Thailand increases IP protection. 
                                                     
68 Benefits of US, Thai Free Trade Agreement Examined, CalTrade Rep., July 
18, 2005,  http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=2315. 
69 Id.
